From LSHG Newsletter #63 (Spring 2018) and #64 (Summer 2018)
The Origins of Collective
Decision Making
(Studies in Critical Social Sciences)
By Andy Blunden
Haymarket 2017
ISBN 978-1608468046
Part 1 (from LSHG Newsletter #63 (Spring 2018)
The Chartists and Democracy
Andy Blunden’s chapter on the Chartists in this book
gives a decent summary of how the movement
worked, at least up until 1848 (after which he is on
less certain ground).
He rightly notes the importance of the 1834 Poor
Law Act in mobilising activity and particularly that
of women. The Chartists contended for universal
male suffrage, but women were active in Chartism,
except at the level of leadership.
The Chartists focused on political democracy, a vote
in Parliamentary elections and representation in
Parliament, and as Blunden notes, the three Chartist
petitions were central to this. They were able in a
few cases to elect Chartist MPs - Feargus O’Connor
sat for Nottingham - under the very limited
democracy introduced by the 1832 Reform Act.
As Blunden also notes the Chartists used various
means, familiar in the modern labour movement, to
organise and mobilise activity. The Chartist weekly
paper the Northern Star was the key organiser and
had the largest sale of any paper in the 1840s. The
early trade unions were also engaged and many
were sympathetic to Chartism.
The National Charter Association formed in 1841 was
the world’s first working class party based, as
Blunden notes, on the kind of local organisation
used by the Methodists.
This was the model
available to the Chartists.
Delegate conferences were held based on majority
voting and Blunden points out that meant that the
views of middle class reformers like Joseph Sturge
were marginalised. Neither on the one side the
influence of money (the Chartists had power of
numbers), nor on the other the idea of a block vote
of affiliated interests, was yet present.
Where Blunden doesn’t quite capture the essence of
Chartism and democracy is looking beyond the
upfront policy of petitioning for Parliamentary
representation, although he clearly references the
much wider range of tactics and strategies the
Chartists used.
They had no model of workers’ democracy to look
to, hence the focus on an expanded and popular
Parliamentary democracy.
However as Trotsky noted
in Where is Britain Going, the Chartists laid down
the original template for what was to follow,
pursuing every angle from the petition to an armed
rising (in Newport in 1839) and a General Strike (in
1842).
As the leading Chartist J R Stephens expressed the
Chartist strategy to win the vote ‘peacably if we
can, forcibly if we must’.
There was still an element of old style conspiratorial
politics about Chartism up to the summer of 1848, as
David Goodway’s London Chartism underlines. After
that, with the failure of the petition in that year,
Chartism moved decisively away from conspiratorial
politics and adopted the social democratic programme
The Charter and Something More.
The 1850s saw the development of forms of Chartist
democracy familiar to this day. A Labour Parliament
was held in 1854 but in practice Ernest Jones
became a one-person Chartist leadership.
Blunden makes the point that after 1848 George
Julian Harney and Ernest Jones established ‘secret
societies’ rather than engaging with democratic
working-class politics.
This is a misunderstanding of
what took place. Harney and Jones were involved
with groups of political refugees from the defeat of
the European 1848 and no doubt there was an
element of secrecy about at least some of this.
The significant change to democratic practice in the
1850s and beyond however was the rise of organised
labour in the form of trade unions, which while
encouraging mass activity, such as that which led to
the 1867 Reform Bill, were also concerned to put in
place a much more formal democratic framework
around their activities which many have seen as the
beginnings of the development of a bureaucracy.
Blunden’s book which ranges across a much wider
range of example in the context of consensus and
majority voting decision making methods, provides a
very useful and insightful comparative historical
tool.
********
Part two of the review (from LSHG Newsletter #64 Summer 2018)
How decisions are made, and in particular how
they are made democratically and in a way that
can give a reasonable prospect of them being
carried through, has concerned the left since
something recognisably associated with that label
has existed.
A concern in the English Civil War and perhaps
particularly after Cromwell replaced Charles I in
1649 was how to make sure that decisions in
Parliament reflected the interests of the poorest
as well as the richest members of society.
The mid-seventeenth century was a precursor to
the democratic age which, broadly, was ushered
in by the French Revolution in 1789. It was in the
wake of this in the 1790s that the London
Corresponding Society decided to open its doors in
principle to ‘members unlimited’ something that
was then, and for much of the first half of the
nineteenth century of doubtful general legality.
Andy Blunden’s book seeks to put the debates
about democracy that have arisen, perhaps
particularly at times of upheaval in society, into
wider framework. So for example he places the
democracy of the 1640s and 1650s in a ‘consensus’
category and that of the 1790s in the majority
category.
Anyone familiar with the left and the labour
movement today will recognise these ways of
reaching decisions as alternatives that are still
very much current. Understanding their history is
therefore of particular importance to activists
today as well as to historians.
Blunden is critical, at least of his own experiences
of consensus decision making on the left, in the
sense that it was difficult to reach consensus and
even more difficult to get a decision carried out.
One might argue that the template for consensus
was the Putney Debates during the English Civil
War, where what to do was extensively discussed,
some agreement reached and some things at least
were implemented. The issue, as the book makes
clear, was that the bottom of line of consensus
was the status quo, which did not reflect the
demand of the Levellers for male suffrage.
Consensus however covers a broad spectrum of
actual perspectives on democracy, as Blunden
underlines in the book. A common issue, as
evidenced by Cromwell’s refusal to carry through
much of what was agreed at Putney in 1647 is that
whoever are actually charged with implementing
decisions tend to do so in ways that suit themselves.
Collective responsibility then becomes an issue of
accountability of leadership.
It is unfortunate in
this respect that Blunden does not explore the
intent behind and the impact of the Clyde
Workers Committee view on leaders in 1917.
Blunden’s conclusion notes that neither majority or
consensual methods of democratic decision making
are automatic routes to getting things done that
have apparently been agreed.
He also notes a third
way of reaching a decision: counsel. That is when
whoever is charged with making a decision takes
‘soundings’ from those concerned or involved and
then makes a decision on that basis.
A good deal of this comes down to what E.P.
Thompson called the ‘legitimizing notion’ for
action to take place. If people are agreed that
something that needs to be done and broadly
what that might be, then it will happen, in some
form, come what may.
Blunden also argues correctly that decision
making is best done from the bottom-up. In
summary those who are most likely to be
expected to carry out a decision and/or be
impacted by what it is have a key say in the
process. That is still far too rare an occurrence.
Blunden’s though provoking book deserves to be
read by anyone involved in trying to change the
world for the better.
Keith Flett
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